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Financial Analysts and Enron:
Asleep at the Wheel?
Arline Savage and Cynthia Miree

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
We attempt to replicate the duties of financial analysts by performing
accounting and financial analyses for Enron, using information contained
in the firm's Security and Exchange Commission filings and in annual
and quarterly reports that were available to analysts prior to the firm's
collapse. We focus on Enron accounting policies, estimates, and financial
measures that reflect the key risk areas that we identified in our strategy
analysis.
Given that the purpose of accounting analysis is to evaluate the degree
to which a finn's
firm's accounting system captures its underlying economic
reality, we attempt to assess the degree of distortion in Enron's reported
numbers, based on our comfort level with management's choice of ac
counting policies and estimates. The purpose of our financial analysis is
to assess the performance of the finn
firm after its efforts to negate the effects
of perceived distortions in the reported numbers. We ask, and attempt to
answer, the question of whether financial analysts should have seen warn
ing signs of Enron's collapse and should have warned investors of the
firm's precarious financial situation long before the unfortunate event sur
prised stockholders and creditors alike.
Our detailed analyses show that from 1997 onward there was evidence
of reporting and performance problems. We highlight areas of major con
cern about profitability and debt levels.
Although Enron management makes an abundance of infonnation
information avail
able to analysts, the language is not always clear; it is confusing even to
accounting experts. The vast amount of information makes the analyst's
job time consuming and tedious, yet essential information, such as sepa
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also had complex ownership arrangements with many other companies and
partnerships. These investments and ownership arrangements may have put a
strain on the firm's capital budgeting and capital management systems.
We now use the conclusions reached in our strategy analysis to investigate
Enron's accounting and financial information, in order to evaluate its financial
performance and determine whether the firm's accounting and financial policies
made sense. We believe that most financial analysts should have seen red flags
and warned investors of the company's shaky financial situation. In this regard,
we highlight actionable danger signals apparent in the financial statements and
mandated Securities and Exchange Commission filings, signals that analysts
should have recognized, identified, and warned stakeholders about.
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ACCOUNTING ANALYSIS
Overview of Accounting Analysis
The purpose of accounting analysis is to evaluate the degree to which a
firm's accounting system captures its underlying economic reality, given in
herent management biases and the substantial accounting flexibility that man
agement is empowered with (Palepu et al. 2000, 3-1). For this purpose we use
Enron's precollapse publicly available and externally audited income state
ments, balance sheets, statements of cash flows, notes to the financial statements,
management discussion and analysis (MD&A) reports, and independent audi
tor reports. We supplement this with other information that was readily avail
able to analysts.
For each financial statement account category-assets, liabilities, sharehold
ers' equity, revenues, and expenses-we use our knowledge ofthe firm's profit
drivers and risk factors to identify key areas of accounting flexibility, bearing
in mind that there are strong relations between the various categories (for ex
ample, revenue recognition policies directly impact assets). We evaluate the
appropriateness of the accounting policies and estimates chosen by manage
ment, and we attempt to assess the degree of distortion in reported numbers.
Where possible, we attempt to negate the effect of perceived distortions in
reported numbers by using cash flow numbers, disclosures made in the notes
to the financial statements, and qualified opinions given by the external audi
tors. This provides us a springboard from which to launch into financial analysis,
using our own adjusted numbers (if deemed necessary) to improve the reli
ability of our financial analysis calculations (see Palepu et al. 2000, 3-1).
Another important part of accounting analysis is to demarcate the bound
aries of the business by looking beyond the legal definitions that normally
COntrol financial reporting. As analysts, we should be far more concerned with
eConomic substance than with legal form. We want to know what resources
the firm controls, a much broader focus than the narrowly defined legal form
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rate disclosures of unrealized gains on trading activities, is not available.
This does not, however, excuse analysts who overwhelmingly would not
see the woods for the trees, and who continued recommending to clients
that they buy or hold Enron stock.
Our investigation shows that the red flags were plentiful and that the
situation was aggravated by the incidents of apparent disdain (reported in
the news media) with which Enron's top management dealt with financial
analysts. The results of our accounting and financial analyses raise issues
about the competence, independence, and objectivity of analysts who con
tinued to recommend this stock.

also had complex ownership arrangements with many other companies and
partnerships. These investments and ownership arrangements may have put a
strain on the firm's capital budgeting and capital management systems.
We now use the conclusions reached in our strategy analysis to investigate
Enron's accounting and financial information, in order to evaluate its financial
and financial policies
performance and determine whether the firm's accounting and
made sense. We believe that most financial analysts should have seen red flags
and warned investors of the company's shaky financial situation. In this regard,
we highlight actionable danger signals apparent in the financial statements and
mandated Securities and Exchange Commission filings, signals that analysts
should have recognized, identified, and warned stakeholders about.

INTRODUCTION
The strategy analysis in the previous chapter allows us to focus on Enron's
related key risk areas for accounting analysis purposes. The first was the fi
nancial success ofits dealer and trading activities. This risk factor stems from
Enron's move away from its successful low-risk core energy businesses into
high-risk dealer and trading activities, including broadband and derivatives
(the specifics of which cannot clearly be identified from strategy disclosures
in public filings). The move put the firm at increased risk into new and ill
defined business operations. According to a group of analysts who questioned
Enron's precollapse performance,
The sustainability of Enron's business model is based on its ability to create and ex
ploit markets, whether they be in energy, bandwidth, freighter capacity, data storage or
toilet paper. Its profit potential declines as a function of the rate at which the markets
mature.... markets mature very quickly these days thanks to the increased sophistica
tion and variety of risk management products and services and speed of information
flows that enhance trading liquidity. (Wasden, Ayers, and Arias 200 1, 6-7)
These analysts (whose opinion differed markedly from most of their peers)
succinctly concluded that Enron's earnings could suffer from the very market
efficiency that the firm had helped to unleash.
The second risk area concerned the maintenance ofinvestor confidence and
access to financing resources. This risk area became especially important from
1999 onward. Management's self-declared intense focus on earnings per share
led to quality of earnings and income management concerns. In addition, man
agement's emphasis on the continued access to financing resources provided
strong motivation to manage ratios stipulated in debt covenants.
A third risk area is the financial success of international high-risk, hard
asset ventures and complex partnership and equity ownership structures. In
vestments in these ventures and entities contradicted management's apparent
new asset-light philosophy. Examples included investments in the litigation
racked Dabhol power plant project in India and water plants in England. Enron
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of an entity. Generally, we would search for hidden commitments or losses
from investments in other entities, the transfer of resources to other entities
that the firm can somehow control (e.g., related entities owned or managed
personally by Enron management), and possible investment in management
pet projects that have high risk and a low return (see Palepu et al. 2000, 8-1).
Therefore, we also perform entity accounting analysis.
When performing the accounting analysis, we take the following six steps,
consistent with the Palepu et al. framework (2000, 3-7 to 3-13):
Step 1: Check the audit report. Is it "clean"? Identify and evaluate the key accounting
policies that Enron uses to measure critical success factors and risk areas.

Step 2: Assess the flexibility that management has in choosing accounting policies and
estimates, and try to discern management's most likely motivation (e.g., to improve
earnings per share and debt covenant ratios).
Step 3: Evaluate accounting strategy. For example, was the strategy used to communi
cate business reality or to hide performance? Does management have strong moti
vation to manage earnings? Regarding earnings management, does the firm have
debt covenants? Has management changed estimates and policies? Is there any evi
dence to suggest that Enron structures business transactions specifically to achieve
certain accounting numbers?
Step 4: Evaluate the depth and quality of the disclosures. For example, do the notes to
the financial statements adequately explain key accounting policies and assump
tions? Does management adequately explain financial performance? What is the
quality of segment disclosures? Does management aggregate many different busi
nesses in a single segment? Does management disclose bad news in addition to good
news? Does management adequately address performance problems? How good is
Enron's investor relations program? How does management deal with analysts?
Step 5: Identify red flags that indicate potential accounting-quality problems and use
these as starting points for further investigation. For example, are there unexplained
changes in accounting? Are there unexplained or complex transactions? Is there an
increasing gap between net income from operations and cash flow from operations?
Is there an increasing gap between net income and taxable income? Is there evi
dence of unusual financing? Are there large and unexpected asset write-offs? Are
there related-party transactions or transactions between related entities that may
lack objectivity in the marketplace---especially in view of Enron's position of power
due to vertical integration, which allowed it to control more than one stage of the
industry'S transactions, including that of market maker? Is there evidence that Enron
exerts control over other entities that are not legally part of the group?

Step 6: Unravel possible accounting distortions by restating reported numbers. This is
not always possible, because of lack of information. The notes to the financial state
ments and the cash flow statement may supply information useful for this purpose.
By making these restatements as analysts, we do not accuse the firm of misstate
ment, but we restate components of the financial statements based on our external
perceptions of the underlying business reality of the firm. In the event of an error in
judgment, we would prefer to err on the side of caution.

Financial Analysts and Enron

79

Asset Analysis
Enron's audit reports from Arthur Andersen are clean. In both the 1999 and
2000 reports, however, Arthur Andersen specifically informs shareholders and
the Board of Directors of the following (using identical wording for both years):
"As discussed in Note 18 to the consolidated financial statements, Enron Corp.
and subsidiaries changed ... its method of accounting for certain contracts in
energy trading and risk management activities in the first quarter of 1999"
(1999 annual report, 40; 2000 annual report, 30). We will deal with the effects
of this very significant accounting change-accounting for contracts (deriva
tives) in energy trading-under asset analysis.
Significant challenges face the financial analyst with regard to reported as
sets. Management often has considerable discretion over whether expendi
tures are capitalized or expensed. Decisions in this area can significantly affect
profits and earnings per share, a ratio that stock market participants (including
the financial news media) and Enron management (by its own admission) were
particularly fixated on. We have already identified this self-declared fixation
as a key risk area for Enron.
Instead of launching into an unstructured examination of Enron's financial
statements, we will (to use the same term that Enron used with regard to earn
ings per share) "laser-focus" on the risk areas that we identified during strat
egy analysis and apply the six accounting analysis steps to each risk area.

The Financial Success ofDealer and Trading Activities
A major area of concern is the firm's move away from its successful core
businesses into higher-risk dealer and trading activities, although this was not
immediately evident to us from strategy disclosures in the firm's public filings
but took some "digging" to discern. Accounting analysis may provide addi
tional insight and either alleviate or strengthen our concerns. A related re
ported asset is called "assets from price risk management activities," and it
was immediately apparent that a decided increase occurred in 2000, in both
absolute and relative terms. The amount of this asset, with the percentage of
total assets in parentheses, for each of the past five years was 1996, $2,473
million (15%); 1997, $2,384 million (11 %); 1998, $3,845 million (13%); 1999,
$5,134 million (15%); and 2000, $21,006 million (32%). This dramatic in
crease coincided with the introduction of Enron Online, which Web-enabled
Enron's trading activities. A scrutiny of the quarterly Form lO-Q filings for
2000 reveals that at the end of the first quarter the amount was $6,567 million
(18%), in the second quarter $10,924 million (24%), and in the third quarter
$14,661 million (28%), a continual increase throughout the year.
Management explains Enron's accounting policy for this asset in footnote 1,
"Summary of Significant Accounting Policies," of the 2000 annual report as
follows (emphasis added by authors):
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Instead of launching into an unstructured examination of Enron's financial
statements, we will (to use the same term that Enron used with regard to earn
ings per share) "laser-focus" on the risk areas that we identified during strat
egy analysis and apply the six accounting analysis steps to each risk area.
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Accounting for Price Risk Management. Enron engages in price risk management
activitiesfor both trading and non-trading purposes. Instruments utilized in connec
tion with trading activities are accounted for using the mark-to-market method. Under
the mark-to-market method of accounting, forwards, swaps, options, energy transpor
tation contracts utilized for trading activities and other instruments with third parties
are reflected at fair value and are shown as "Assets and Liabilities from Price Risk
Management Activities" in the Consolidated Balance Sheet. These activities also in
clude the commodity risk management component embedded in energy outsourcing
contracts. Unrealized gains and losses from newly originated contracts, contract
restructurings and the impact of price movements are recognized as "Other
"Othe r Revenues."
... The market prices used to value these transactions reflect management's best esti
mate considering various factors including closing exchange and over-the-counter quo
tations, time value and volatility factors underlying the commitments. (p. 36)

Table 5.1
Enron's Net Assets from Price-Risk-ManagementActivities (In Millions of US.
Dollars)
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The question that comes to mind is: What percentage of net income is at
tributable to these unrealized gains that are included in earned revenue? As the
footnote mentions, revenues from price risk management activities are not
shown separately on the income statement but are unobtrusively lumped in
with "Other Revenue."
Revenue." Nevertheless, we attempt to quantify the revenue im
pact of these financial instrument trading activities by appealing to the state
ment of cash flows and the reconciliation between accrual-based net income
(which is increased by these activities) and cash generated by operating ac
tivities (which excludes revenue from these activities because the revenue is
unrealized and has not been collected). After taking into consideration Enron's
disclosure of significant accounting policies-"Enron engages in price risk
management activities for both trading and non-trading purposes,"-we de
cided on a wish list of what we would like to see in the statement of cash
flows.
First, under "Cash Flows from Operating Activities," we would like to see
the following line items for net price risk management assets: unrealized gains
(losses) on trading price risk management assets and unrealized gains on non
trading price-risk-management assets.
Second, under "Cash Flows from Investing Activities," we would like to
see the aggregate amount of expenditures on the portion of net price-risk
management assets reported as noncurrent (and hence nontrading net assets,
in our view as outsiders without proprietary information or management dis
closure to the contrary), as well as proceeds from the sale of such noncurrent
net assets.
We are disappointed on both counts. An analysis and attempt at recalcula
tion of the single line item of disclosure on "net assets from price risk manage
ment activities" under "Cash Flows from Operating Activities" reveals that
current and noncurrent net assets have been lumped together; only the net
asset increase has been disclosed (note that there is a $17 million unexplained
discrepancy in 2000). Details of our calculations appear in table 5.1.

2000
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Net Current Assets
Non-Current Assets
Non-Current Liabilities
Net Non-Current Assets

81

12,018
10,495
],523

1999
2,205
1,836
369

8,988
9,423
(435)

2,929
2,990
(61 )

1,9411
],421
5201

1,038
876
162

1,088

308

(87) I

263

780
763

395
395

(17)

°

1998
1,904
2,511
(607)

(350)
(350)
0

1997
1,346
],245
\01

(20])

°

*Entire amount classified as resulting from "operating" activities as opposed to the long-term
portion being classified as resulting from investing activities.

The effects of Enron's highly aggregated disclosure are first, that unreal
ized gains or losses in net income cannot be ascertained; and second, cash
flow effects of nontrading risk-management activities have been excluded from
"Cash Flows from Investing Activities" and diverted to the operating activities
section of the cash flow statement. Enron does have nontrading activities in
this regard, as evidenced by its disclosure that "Enron engages in price risk
management activities for both trading and non-trading purposes." If we ac
cept that the noncurrent net assets should be excluded from the operating sec
tion, the impact on operating cash flow would be positive, at $708 million
instead of $350 million, for 1998; negative, at $976 million instead of $395
million for 1999; and negative at $1,154 million instead of $763 million, for
2000. Cash flows relating to investing activities would be affected by the same
amounts but in the opposite direction.
The reported effects of the change in net assets from risk-management ac
tivities on operating cash flow from 1996 to 2000 are as follows (percentage
impact on net income before tax is shown in parentheses): 1996, $15 million
negative (minus 3%); 1997, $201 million negative (minus 191 %); 1998, $350
million negative (minus 50%); 1999, $395 million positive (44%); and 2000,
$763 million positive (78%). Scrutiny of the quarterly Form lO-Q filings for
2000 reveals that at the end of the third quarter the negative impact on cash
flow amounted to $952 million, exceeding the net income amount of $919
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Accounting for Price Risk Management. Enron engages in price risk management
activitiesfor both trading and non-trading purposes. Instruments utilized in connec
tion with trading activities are accounted for using the mark-to-market method. Under

Table5.1
5.1
Table
Enron's
Enron'sNet
NetAssets
Assetsfrom
fromPrice-Risk-ManagementActivities
Price-Risk-ManagementActivities(In
(InMillions
MillionsofD.S.
of US.
Dollars)
Dollars)

the mark-to-market method of accounting, forwards, swaps, options, energy transpor
tation contracts utilized for trading activities and other instruments with third parties
are reflected at fair value and are shown as "Assets and Liabilities from Price Risk
Management Activities" in the Consolidated Balance Sheet. These activities also in
clude the commodity risk management component embedded in energy outsourcing
contracts. Unrealized gains and losses from newly originated contracts, contract
restructurings and the impact of price movements are recognized as "Other Revenues."
... The market prices used to value these transactions reflect management's best esti
mate considering various factors including closing exchange and over-the-counter quo

tations, time value and volatility factors underlying the commitments. (p. 36)
The question that comes to mind is: What percentage of net income is at
tributable to these unrealized gains that are included in earned revenue? As the
footnote mentions, revenues from price risk management activities are not
shown separately on the income statement but are unobtrusively lumped in
with "Other Revenue." Nevertheless, we attempt to quantify the revenue im
pact of these financial instrument trading activities by appealing to the state
ment of cash flows and the reconciliation between accrual-based net income
(which is increased by these activities) and cash generated by operating ac
tivities (which excludes revenue from these activities because the revenue is
unrealized and has not been collected). After taking into consideration Enron's
disclosure of significant accounting policies-"Enron engages in price risk
management activities for both trading and non-trading purposes,"-we de
cided on a wish list of what we would like to see in the statement of cash
flows.
First, under "Cash Flows from Operating Activities," we would like to see
the following line items for net price risk management assets: unrealized gains
(losses) on trading price risk management assets and unrealized gains on non
trading price-risk-management assets.
Second, under "Cash Flows from Investing Activities," we would like to
see the aggregate amount of expenditures on the portion of net price-risk
management assets reported as noncurrent (and hence nontrading net assets,
in our view as outsiders without proprietary information or management dis
closure to the contrary), as well as proceeds from the sale of such noncurrent
net assets.
We are disappointed on both counts. An analysis and attempt at recalcula
tion of the single line item of disclosure on "net assets from price risk manage
ment activities" under "Cash Flows from Operating Activities" reveals that
current and noncurrent net assets have been lumped together; only the net
asset increase has been disclosed (note that there is a $17 million unexplained
discrepancy in 2000). Details of our calculations appear in table 5.1.
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The effects of Enron's highly aggregated disclosure are first, that unreal
ized gains or losses in net income cannot be ascertained; and second, cash
flow effects of nontrading risk-management activities have been excluded from
"Cash Flows from Investing Activities" and diverted to the operating activities
section of the cash flow statement. Enron does have nontrading activities in
this regard, as evidenced by its disclosure that "Enron engages in price risk
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unprecedented and surprising move, a post-Enron SEC has taken this notion a
step farther. In a warning by the chief accountant for the SEC's enforcement
division (Liesman 2002), management and the auditors have been informed in
no uncertain terms that it is possible to violate SEC laws while being in compli
ance with generally accepted accounting principles. Therefore, mere compliance
with the rules without considering whether the results "fairly present" finan
cial performance could lead to legal proceedings for securities fraud. It is in
this light that we discuss briefly the FASB standards for derivatives, by which
Enronjustified its mark-to-market valuation approach.
Derivatives are initiated via legal contracts, without any immediate signifi
cant expenditure. These contracts represent legal rights and obligations, from
which assets and liabilities arise. Enron to some degree highlighted this prob
lem when during the first half of the 1990s it took the lead and incorporated
mark-to-market accounting for energy-related derivative contracts and there
after used it on an unprecedented scale. Under mark-to-market rules, assets
and liabilities resulting from the legal rights and obligations of the contracts
are recorded at fair market value. The determination of a fair value at which to
record these rights and obligations as assets and liabilities is a major problem
in accounting for markets that are largely unregulated and not well established,
with no quoted prices. Enron began trading in a variety of these markets as a
first-mover (for example, trading in energy-related derivatives, bandwidth, data
storage, paper, and weather derivatives) and essentially caught accounting stan
dard setters off guard. Firms like Enron were free to develop and use discretionary
valuation models to value their assets and liabilities, allowing considerable
management discretion. The resultant unrealized gains or losses were used to
determine net income. Existing financial instruments standards had not been
prepared with unregulated markets (such as those that Enron created) in mind.
The latitude that Enron had, by which it acted as buyer, seller, and market
maker, exacerbated this situation, regardless of whether or not it followed FASB
standards. Consequently, we do not feel at all comfortable with the quality of
these earnings.
From a financial analysis perspective, because of Enron's multiple roles
(buyer, seller, market maker) and resultant quality of earnings concerns, we
argue for the reversal of unrealized gains until such time as realization war
rants recognition as revenue. In the event of a net unrealized loss, we support
a transfer to the income statement, invoking the conservatism concept in ac
counting as justification for the disparate treatment. As we cannot determine
the amount of the unrealized gains because of insufficient disclosure in the
cash flow statements, we will use the cash flow numbers as reported by Enron
(although we strongly suspect that these are also flawed, because noncurrent
price risk net assets are treated as current and operating). However, we will
adjust net income to the best of our ability to negate the effect of increases
resulting from these activities. The cash flow does provide an alternative bench
mark for reporting (Palepu et al. 2000, 3-13). This is the route we will take for
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million. This switch from a negative cash-flow impact situation (1996 to 1998)
to a positive situation (1999 and 2000) may be related to the adoption at the
beginning of 1999 of the Emerging Issues Task Force Issue No. 98-10, "Ac
counting for Contracts Involved in Energy Trading and Risk Management Ac
tivities," which requires energy trading contracts (including energy
transportation contracts) to be recorded at fair value on the balance sheet (mark
to market). This standard gave the rubber stamp to management to use its
considerable discretion as buyer, seller, and market maker in determining the
value of its price-risk-management assets and liabilities. The cumulative fi
nancial effect of this accounting change on net income was not separately
quantified but was aggregated in the amount of $131 million, together with an
amount relating to another accounting change made at the beginning of 1999.
Taken at face value, the effect of the change does not appear to be material.
The Accounting Pronouncements footnote states, "The first quarter 1999 charge
was primarily related to the adoption of SOP 98-5," which requires the ex
pensing of all startup and organization costs. However, once the new Emerg
ing Issues standard on energy trading contracts was issued, the managemen
of Enron was effectively given carte blanche on related net-asset valuations.
As discussed in the strategy analysis, Enron changed its SIC code during
the last quarter of 2000, probably because of its focus on energy trading ac
tivities. This knowledge, coupled with our concerns about unrealized gains o
risk-management nets assets, leads us directly into the second risk factor
management's self-declared sharp focus on earnings per share. Our concern
are heightened because management, by its own admission in the quoted ac
counting policy statement, largely determines the market value of these finan
cial instruments, including energy transportation contracts, in an unregulate
market. Coincidently, in late 2000 Congress passed legislation that exempte
over-the-counter derivatives from regulation after some very aggressive lob
bying by Enron (see Schroeder and Ip 2001; Schroeder 2002). This marke
was new and largely initiated by Enron, often without externally quoted price
upon which to base asset valuations. Enron, in its capacity as the market maker
was free to effectively manage its earnings. A major concern that comes t
mind is whether management is using these unrealized gains to make up fo
possible poor performance in other high-risk ventures, such as the asset-intensiv
Dabhol power plant in India, water systems, and broadband.
Even if a firm chooses to blindly follow an accounting standard, withou
considering the underlying business reality, the resultant financial informatio
can be misleading. The question is this: Does the selection of the policy o
estimate result in the closest portrayal of business reality, fairly presenting th
underlying economic conditions? If the analyst believes that business realit
is not reflected, she or he should attempt to undo distortions caused by th
selection of a particular accounting policy or estimate, regardless of its institu
tionalized general acceptance. This notion is not new (see Palepu et al. 2000
but it gained prominence with the spate of recent accounting failures. In a
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Enron in undoing distortions before performing our financial analysis. As a
result, net income will change materially for 1999 and 2000, with a resultant
decrease in earnings per share, and net assets from price risk management
activities will be reduced. We acknowledge that our adjustment has limita
tions, in that the full amount of the increase in net assets (included in our
adjustment because these amounts have not been disclosed separately on the
cash flow statements) does not have an effect on net income. The effect is
limited to unrealized gains, which cannot be determined because of lack of
information in Enron's disclosures.
We will now proceed with an examination of the company's ventures into
broadband. We analyze the MD&A and the Broadband Services business seg
ment, which makes its debut in the 2000 annual report, although Enron had
dabbled in broadband since 1998 at the very latest but had been incorporating
it in other business segment disclosures. The MD&A disclosure includes the
following statement: "Broadband Services is constructing ... a nationwide
fiber-optic network that consists of both fiber deployed by Enron and acquired
capacity on other non-Enron networks and is managed by Enron's Broadband
Operating System software. Enron is extending its market-making and risk
management skills from its energy business to develop the bandwidth interme
diation business" (2000 annual report, 25). The segment disclosure shows identi
fiable assets ($1,313 million) and capital expenditures ($436 million) for the 2000
fiscal year. This is a new industry, and the risk is high. In theory, this could be
a very successful venture for Enron, but if a glut of fiber-optic capacity devel
ops, Enron may have to take a hit against its asset values. This would, in turn,
reduce net income. We cannot predict an outcome, but the risk is high, espe
cially since, after three years of experimentation, broadband generated a net
loss of $60 million for the 2000 fiscal year (2000 annual report, 51).

The Maintenance of
ofInvestor
Investor Confidence and
andAccess
Access to
Financing Resources, and Resultant Focus on Earnings per
Share and Components of
ofOther
Other Key Financial Ratios
Assets are often components of key ratios, either as an absolute amount, or
because of the key role that asset valuation plays in income determination,
stemming from the relationship between assets and revenues and assets and
expenses. A major concern regarding this risk area is covered in the preceding
discussion on Enron's change in operating activities. However, we want to
determine whether there are any other asset amounts that we need to examine
more closely, after we consider the degree of risk with regard to possible asset
misstatement.
To get a feel for this risk, we ask the following questions: How good is
Enron's investor relations program? How does management deal with ana
lysts? Here, we resort to external sources for answers.
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We could find only a few voices of dissent in the analyst community prior
to November 2001. For example, as far back as March 2001, the Reed Wasden
Research team wrote: "At the risk of offending Enron's mighty investor rela
tions army [emphasis added], we will attempt to paint a simplistic portrait of
what we believe Enron really is" (Wasden, Ayers, and Arias 2001, 4). This
firm appears to have emerged unscathed after questioning Enron's future pros
pects, but other dissenting analysts were not as fortunate. One of these was
Chung Wu of DBS PaineWebber (Lozano 2002; Babineck 2002). Another
was Daniel Scotto, a bond analyst in New York for BNP Paribas, a French
securities firm (Smith 2002).
Wu sent an e-mail message to his clients on August 21,2001, expressing
concern about Enron's financial future and advising them to sell their Enron
stock. He was fired the same day. This happened a week after Jeffrey Skilling
resigned as Enron's chief executive officer. At the time, Enron stock was in
the range of $36, less than half of its peak earlier in the year. In a regulatory
filing dated August 31,2001, to the National Association of Securities Deal
ers, Wu made the following statement: "Enron management was not pleased
and due to the employee stock option relationship DBS PaineWebber has with
them, the pressure came from my corporate office to the branch level (Hous
ton) to dismiss me." (For detailed newswire reports, see Lozano 2002; Babineck
2002.) DBS PaineWebber did not deny that it had sacked Chung, nor did the
firm deny that the dismissal came after complaints about the e-mail from the
Enron executive in charge of its stock option program (Washington Post March
28, 2002, A47).
Another example is that of Scotto, a thirty-year Wall Street veteran, who
issued a research report to his clients on August 23,2001, in which he lowered
his recommendation on Enron from "buy" to "neutral" and suggested that
Enron be used as a "source of funds" (i.e., in analyst language, "consider selling
the stock to raise funds for other investments"). He followed up his written report
with a conference call, recorded from the firm's trading floor, wherein he ad
vised his clients to dump Enron securities. Shortly afterward, he was demoted,
put on leave, and then terminated. BNP Paribas declined to give reporters
reasons for Scotto's termination but made the statement that it "was com
pletely unrelated to any research he wrote on any company, including Enron."
Scotto, however, claims that BNP Paribus had an investment-banking rela
tionship with Enron. (For the detailed business news report, see Smith 2002.)
Management's seemingly aggressive and intimidating manner of handling
adverse analyst reports should have incensed the financial analyst community,
as it impairs its independence. The Reed Wasden quote shows that analysts
were well aware of the "mighty investor relations army." This behavior toward
analysts does not inspire confidence in reported numbers. One has to ask the
question: What is Enron trying to hide? It is in this light that we scrutinize
asset balances and the related accounting policies.
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Financial Analysts and Enron

The following asset balances catch our eye: first, "Investments in and ad
vances to unconsolidated equity affiliates," which increased by 211 % between
1996 and 2000, from $1,701 million to $5,294 million; second, "Other invest
ments," which increased by 236%, over the same period, from $1,626 million
to $5,459 million. A related accounting policy intensified our interest: "In
vestments in unconsolidated affiliates are accounted for by the equity method,
except for certain investments resulting from Enron's merchant investment
activities which are included at market value in 'Other Investments' in the
Consolidated Balance Sheet. See Notes 4 and 9. Where acquired assets are
accounted for under the equity method based on temporary control, earnings
and losses are recognized only for the portion of the investment to be retained"
(2000 annual report, 37). On reading footnotes 4 and 9, we decide that this is
a major area of concern and that these assets will best be discussed under the
Equity Accounting Analysis subsection.
Second, we would like to see more transparency on "Other" assets, classi
fied under "Investments and Other Assets." The amounts are material-for
example, $5,459 million for 2000 and $4,681 for 1999. Without knowing the
nature of these assets, it is difficult to determine whether we would prefer to
expense part or all of these assets.

flow statement better fulfills our information requirements for merchant as
sets and investments than it did for net assets from risk-management activi
ties, we are concerned about the additions and unrealized gains being aggregated
and shown on a single line item. This severely hampered our ability to make
accurate adjustments for unrealized gains, which may have much less of an
impact on net income than we are surmising. There is a lack of disaggregated
information disclosure for this line item, but due to the potential for manage
ment manipulation of these numbers, we decided to treat this line item as an
unrealized gain in its entirety, as we did for net assets from risk-management
activities. The potential impact is too great for us to ignore such an adjust
ment, and we would rather err on the side of caution. We do, however, realize
that our adjustment has limitations, in that the "additions" component of the
line item "Additions and Unrealized Gains" does not have an effect on net
income. Our adjustment is therefore misstated by the amount of the unknown
cost of these additions.
Hard-asset, high-risk ventures, such as Dabhol Power and Wessex Water,
are included in unconsolidated affiliates, and as such the assets are kept offEnron's
balance sheet. This issue is dealt with under Entity Accounting Analysis.
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Liability Analysis and Shareholders' Equity Analysis
The Financial Success of International High-Risk,
Hard-Asset Ventures and Complex
Partnership and Equity Ownership Structures
Footnote 4 (2000 annual report, 40), "Merchant Activities," shows a split
between "Merchant Investments" in the amount of $601 million (included in
"Other Assets" on the balance sheet) and "Merchant Assets" of $89 million (in
cluded in "Investments in and Advances to Unconsolidated Equity Affiliates").
The cash flow statements show that both merchant investments and mer
chant assets are generators of net income from operating activities, despite the
fact that a large portion is included under noncurrent assets on the balance
sheet. This suggests the possibility that cash flow from operations may be
overstated (as was possible with net assets from price-management activities).
In this regard, disclosures in the cash flow statements show how accrual-based
net income is converted to cash flow from operations. In 2000, the line item
"Additions and Unrealized Gains" on merchant assets and investments is de
ducted from net income to arrive at cash flow from operating activities, to the
tune of $1,295 million. Comparative amounts for this line item were 1999,
$827 million; 1998, $721 million; 1997, $308 million; and 1996, $192 mil
lion. We have already decided to adjust net income from operations down
ward for unrealized gains on price-risk-management activities; a similar
adjustment for "Additions and Unrealized Gains" on merchant assets and in
vestments has a profound negative affect on net income, especially for 2000.
"Other Assets" will also be decreased, for duality purposes. Although the cash

There are two types of claims against a firm's assets: liabilities and share
holders' equity. Equity is, by definition, a residual value. Therefore, fair valu
ations of assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses automatically result in a
fair residual value. Accounting questions concerning equity generally revolve
around hybrid securities, interest rates used to value long-term debt, and the
allocation of equity amounts between reserves, retained earnings, and capital.
Some important questions concerning Enron's liabilities are: Does the firm
have a business strategy that appears to favor off-balance sheet financing to
improve debt ratios? Are these significant? (see Palepu et al. 2000, 5-1 to 5-2,
5-14). We now examine liabilities and equity under each of the key risk areas.

The Financial Success ofDealer and Trading Activities
Enron's ''Accounting for Price Risk Management" is described under Asset
Analysis. Just as these contracts have asset implications to capture rights, they
also capture Enron's contractual obligations. The difference between the as
sets and liabilities for each contract results in unrealized gains or losses, using
the mark-to-market method of valuation, which has already been discussed
under Asset Analysis. The resultant liabilities are shown as "Liabilities from
Price Risk Management Activities" on the Consolidated Balance Sheet. We
have already discussed the reasoning behind our decision to reverse such un
realized gains, even though the exact amount could not be determined due to
incomplete information.
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Footnote 7 of
ofthe
the1998
1998 annual report (p. 55) delineates an important timeframe
timeframe
with regard to debt: "Enron has credit facilities with domestic and foreign
banks which provide for an aggregate of $1.67 billion in long-term committed
credit and $1.37 billion in short-term committed credit. Expiration dates of
the committed facilities range from April 1999 to June 2002
2002....
.... Certain credit
facilities contain covenants which must be met to borrow funds."
funds." From this
quote, it is clear that continued financial success during this window period is
essential to the company's ability to maintain external financing. It provides a
very strong incentive for management to maintain the ratios stipulated in the
debt covenants.
In the 2000 annual report, in the MD&A (p. 27), management confirms this
risk factor: "Enron is party to certain financial contracts which contain provi
provi
sions for early settlement in the event of a significant market price decline ...
or if the credit ratings for Enron's secured, senior long-term debt obligations
fall below investment grade
.... Enron's continued investment grade status is
grade....
critical to the success of its wholesale businesses as well as its ability to main
main
tain adequate liquidity."
liquidity." According to the 1998-2000 annual reports, Enron
consistently maintained its credit ratings. But the possibility of an understate
understate
ment of liabilities is a key consideration, especially when favorable credit rat
rat
ings are so critical to the firm's success.
To get a feel for long-term debt obligations, we summarize the disclosures on
annual maturities oflong-term debt outstanding for 1998 to 2000 (see table 5.2).
In the 2000 annual report (p. 41), long-term debt due during 2001 rocketed
to $2.1 billion, from $569 the year before. The sudden escalation in the amount
of this debt is a major cause for concern, especially when compared to prior
year long-term debt levels. We will place particular emphasis on this risk area
when we do ratio analysis in the financial analysis section.

The Financial Success of
ofInternational
International High-Risk, Hard-Asset
Ventures and Complex Partnership and Equity Ownership
Structures
Unconsolidated affiliates provide management with the opportunity to un
un
derstate liabilities. This topic is fully investigated in the subsection dealing
with entity accounting analysis, and it is a major area of concern.
In addition, Enron entered into complex equity arrangements and commit
commit
ments, and the related disclosures are confusing, to say the very least. The
disclosure in the 2000 annual report illustrates the difficulties confronting an
analyst:
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Table 5.2
Enron's Reported Long-Term Debt Maturity Values (In Millions of U.S.
Dollars)
Matures
1998 Report
1999 Report
2000 Report

1999

541

N/A
N/A

2000

413
670

N/A

2001

666
569
2,112

2002
182
432

2003
656

750

852

2004

N/A

494

493
646

2005

N/A
N/A
1,592

In 1999, Enron entered into a Share Settlement Agreement under which Enron could
be obligated, under certain conditions, to deliver additional shares of common stock or
Series B Preferred Stock to Whitewing for the amount that the market price of the
converted Enron common shares is less than $28 per share. In 2000, Enron increased
the strike price in the Share Settlement Agreement to $48.55 per share in exchange for
an additional capital contribution in Whitewing by third-party investors.... Absent
certain defaults or other specified events, Enron has the option to acquire the third
party investors' interests. HEnron does not acquire the third-party investors' interests
before January 2003, or earlier upon certain specified events, Whitewing may liqui
date its assets and dissolve. (p. 43)

Whitewing is one of Enron's 50 percent unconsolidated equity affiliates.
This is but the tip of the iceberg. A separate disclosure note reveals (2000
annual report, 42), "In 2000 and 1999, Enron sold approximately $632 mil
lion and $192 million, respectively, of merchant investments and other assets
to Whitewing. Enron recognized no gains or losses in connection with these
transactions." This is but one of many very troubling and confusing disclo
sures of intermingled "unconsolidated affiliate" disclosures.
Revenue Analysis
Revenue should only be recognized if Enron has provided all, or substan
tially all, of the goods or services to the customer and if the customer with
reasonable confidence is expected to pay cash.

The Financial Success ofDealer and Trading Activities
The 2000 quarterly results show increasing and unprecedented levels of rev
enue for each quarter. For example, revenues for the third quarter skyrocketed
from $16.9 billion for the preceding quarter to $30 billion, a 77 percent increase.
The fourth quarter shows revenues of $40.8 billion. A partial explanation is
that unrealized gains resulting from "Assets from Price-Risk-Management

-

-----
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converted Enron common shares is less than $28 per share. In 2000, Enron increased
the strike price in the Share Settlement Agreement to $48.55 per share in exchange for
an additional capital contribution in Whitewing by third-party investors .... Absent
third
certain defaults or other specified events, Enron has the option to acquire the third
interests. HEnron does not acquire the third-party investors' interests
party investors' interests.HEnron
liqui
before January 2003, or earlier upon certain specified events, Whitewing may liqui
date its assets and dissolve. (p. 43)
Whitewing is one of Enron's 50 percent unconsolidated equity affiliates.
A separate disclosure note reveals (2000
This is but the tip of the iceberg. A
mil
annual report, 42), "In 2000 and 1999, Enron sold approximately $632 mil
lion and $192 million, respectively, of merchant investments and other assets
to Whitewing. Enron recognized no gains or losses in connection with these
transactions." This is but one of many very troubling and confusing disclo
disclo
transactions."
sures of intermingled "unconsolidated affiliate" disclosures.

Revenue Analysis
substan
Revenue should only be recognized if Enron has provided all, or substan
tially all, of the goods or services to the customer and if the customer with
reasonable confidence is expected to pay cash.

The Financial Success of Dealer and Trading Activities
rev
The 2000 quarterly results show increasing and unprecedented levels of rev
enue for each quarter. For example, revenues for the third quarter skyrocketed
from $16.9 billion for the preceding quarter to $30 billion, a 77 percent increase.
A partial explanation is
The fourth quarter shows revenues of $40.8 billion. A
that unrealized gains resulting from "Assets from Price-Risk-Management
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Activities" were included in "Other Revenues" on the income statements, an
issue addressed as part of asset analysis. The cash-flow statements also show
that merchant assets and investments generated unrealized gains. From a rev
enue-recognition perspective, the issue revolves around the ability to eventu
ally collect the cash related to unrealized gains, which management recorded
as revenue. We choose to exclude these gains from revenues for purposes of
financial analysis.

The Maintenance of
ofInvestor
Investor Confidence and
andAccess
Access to
Financing Resources, and Resultant Focus on Earnings per
Share and Components of
ofOther
Other Key Financial Ratios
Management included revenues from unconsolidated equity affiliates (re
lated parties) of $150 million in 2000, $674 million in 1999, $563 million in
1998, and $219 million in 1997. We believe that these transactions should be
eliminated on consolidation, and we will deal with this issue under entity ac
counting analysis. However, we find an obvious contradiction and a very strong
warning signal in wording that Enron uses in an explanatory small-print foot
note to its reporting on "Unaffiliated Revenues" amounts: "Unaffiliated rev
enues include sales to unconsolidated equity affiliates" (2000 annual report,
51). Enron's so-called unaffiliated revenues, which have shown a rampant
increase, include non-arm's length sales to affiliates. Examples of percentage
holdings in these affiliates are Azurix Corp., Citrus Corp., Dabhol Power, and
JED
JEDI-all
I-all 50 percent; Jacare Electrical-51 percent; Enron Teesside-lOO
Teesside-IOO
percent (disclosed in the 2000 annual report, 56).

I!

The Financial Success of
ofInternational
International High-Risk, Hard-Asset
Ventures and Complex Partnership and Equity Ownership
Structures
By consolidating unconsolidated equity affiliates (see Entity Accounting
Analysis), we may be able to partially undo revenue distortions with regard to
this risk area.
Expense Analysis
Reporting challenges related to expenses arise when resources provide ben
efits over multiple accounting periods (e.g., goodwill), the timing and amount
of future payments are uncertain (e.g., pension benefits); it is difficult to deter
mine a value for resources consumed (e.g., stock option compensation) and the
decline in value of unused resources (e.g., asset impairments and changes in the
value of financial instruments). Typically, we appeal to the matching and con
servatism principles to arrive at a fair value (Palepu et al. 2000, 7-1 to 7-16).
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The Financial Success ofDealer and Trading Activities
If the broadband business segment proves to be unsuccessful, it could result
in a write-off of a portion, or all, of the broadband assets of $1,313 million.
The future profitability of this new business area, far removed from Enron's
core area of expertise, is uncertain and risky, but we do not know enough to
make any adjustments to the numbers. This possibility was discussed under
the asset analysis. We also discussed unrealized losses resulting from trading
in derivatives under asset analysis.

The Maintenance ofInvestor Confidence and Access to
Financing Resources, and Resultant Focus on Earnings per
Share and Components of Other Key Financial Ratios
Enron's focus on earnings per share leads us to consider the possible under
statement of expenses, rather than overstatement. Specifically, we consider
whether any reported assets should be expensed (e.g., goodwill and other in
tangibles) and whether there are expenses that have been completely omitted
(e.g., stock-option remuneration). We also look for large and unexpected asset
write-offs, which may indicate management reluctance to incorporate chang
ing business conditions into accounting estimates, especially if unfavorable to
earnings per share (Palepu et al. 2000, 3-12).
First, we consider "Goodwill" and "Other" assets (which are disclosed just
below the goodwill line item). These are reported as follows. For Goodwill:
1996, $0.87 billion; 1997 and 1998, $1.9 billion; 1999, $2.8 billion; 2000,
$3.6 billion. For Other: 1996, $1.6 billion; 1997, $3.7 billion; 1998, $4.4 bil
lion; 1999, $4.7 billion; 2000, $5.5 billion. These assets have increased pro
gressively and form a substantial portion of total assets, but we have no way of
estimating possible overstatements or impairments. It is unusual to see assets
in the billions classified as "Other." We would like to see more disclosure on
the nature of these assets.
Next, we consider employee stock option expenses. Companies are not re
quired to include employee stock-option expenses in net-income calculations,
even though the expense can be material. This expense should appear on the
income statement, but the Financial Accounting Standards Board bent to in
tense corporate lobbying and political pressure and in 1995 released FASB
Statement 123, which compromised by requesting that the expense be recorded
but allowing it to be disclosed in the footnotes if the company wished, effec
tively allowing for overstatement of net income and earnings per share. We
are not surprised that Enron chose the footnote-disclosure route. Fortunately,
FASB Statement 128 requires disclosure of diluted earnings per share, which
includes the effects of unexercised options. Therefore, the reported impact of
unexercised stock options (an unrecorded expense) can be estimated by exam
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The Financial Success of
ofInternational
International High-Risk, Hard-Asset
Ventures and Complex Partnership and Equity Ownership
Structures
The
The MD&A (2000 annual report, 21) mentions a $326 million
million impairment
impairment
charge
charge for Azurix,
Azurix, a water and wastewater "unconsolidated
"unconsolidated equity affiliate"
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ofEnron's
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By consolidating unconsolidated equity affiliates (see Entity-Accounting
Entity-Accounting
Analysis), we may be
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be able to
to partially undo distortions with regard
expense risk area.
Another problem we experienced is the lack of disclosure on foreign assets.
We were unable to determine whether the reported value of foreign assets
could be impaired.
Entity-AccountingAnalysis
Analysis
Entity-Accounting

I

Entity-accounting analysis is crucial in determining reporting boundaries
for financial analysis purposes. The focus is on resources that an entity con
trols in evaluating performance rather than on legal definitions of control. The
accounting challenge is whether to aggregate the financial performance of
two or more reporting entities (see Palepu et al. 2000, 8-1). Enron has a com
ofrelated
related unconsolidated affiliates and related par
plex and confusing myriad of
ties. A convolution of financing and other arrangements, combined with
bewildering disclosures, make this a difficult and troubling area to examine.

The Financial Success of
ofInternational
International High-Risk, Hard-Asset
Ventures and Complex Partnership and Equity Ownership
Structures
Footnote 9 (2000 annual report, 42--43)
42-43) makes warning bells go off. Enron's
unconsolidated equity affiliates are mostly 50 percent holdings. Are we to
believe that a company of Enron's size, stature, and aggressiveness does not
exercise control over these affiliates? This is especially pertinent when we
consider the power that Enron management appears to exert over financial
analysts. In addition, Enron guarantees the performance, liabilities, and lease
obligations of some these affiliates to the tune of over $2.5 billion. Is this the
action of a third party without control over these entities? Is it possible that
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Enron purposely structured its holdings to be exactly at 50 percent mainly to
avoid consolidation? Some of the unconsolidated affiliates even exceed the
rule-of-thumb limit of 50 percent. For example, on December 31, 1998, Enron's
ownership interest in one unconsolidated affiliate, Enron Teesside Operations,
was 100 percent. Enron's position is that it intended to ultimately hold a vot
ing interest of no more than 50 percent and therefore chooses not to consoli
date. We beg to differ.
Asset-heavy Dabhol Power Company and Wessex Water are included in
these unconsolidated affiliates, along with the JEDI and JEDI II and other
partnerships. Enron states in the footnote that it has also entered into various
arms-length administrative service, management, construction, supply, and
operating agreements with these affiliates, but based on the percentage hold
ings, we discount this assertion. The footnotes include a summary balance
sheet of all the affiliates combined. In our adjustments, we will use the infor
mation obtained from the financial statements and shown in table 5.3 to con
solidate these affiliates. This affects not only asset balances but also liabilities,
shareholders' equity, and net income for 1996 to 2000.

Table 5.3�
Financial Information for Unconsolidated Equity Affiliates (In Millions of U.S.�
Dollars)�

Investment in Affiliates
Eguity in Earnings (Losses)
Balance Sheet

-

.-- ..-._._._-_ ..,.. _--

Current Assets
Property, Plant & Equipment (net)
Other Non-Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Long-Term Debt
Other Non-Current Liabilities
Owners' Equity

2000
5,294
87

1999
5,036
309

1998
4,433
97

1997
1996
2,656 -_.__ ._.1,701
__._.,-.._-.216 --_._------------
215

5,884'
14,786
13,485
4,739 b
9,717 h
6,148
13,551

3,168'
14,356
9,459
4,401 b
8,486 b
2,402
11,694

2,309'
12,640
7,176
3,501 b
7,621 h
2,016
8,987

3,611
8,851
1,089
1,861 h
5,694h
1,295
4,701

2,587
8,064
902
2,381
5,230
1,139
2,803

15,903
14,710
586
137

11,568
9,449
1,857
482

8,508
7,244
142
87

11,183
10,246
336
118

8,258
7,335
226
68

Income Statement C
Operating Revenues
Operating Expenses
Net Income

Distributions Paid to Enron

Source: Notes to the Financial Statements in 1998, 1999, and 2000 annual reports; 1997 Form�
1O-K.�
'Includes Receivables from Enron: 2000, $410 million; 1999, $327 million; 1998, $196 million.�
bIncludes Payables to Enron: 2000, $302 million; 1999, $84 million; 1998, $296 million;�
1997, $569 million.�
'Enron recognized revenues from transactions with unconsolidated equity affiliates: 2000,�
$510 million; 1999, $674 million; 1998, $563 million; 1997, $219 million.�

92

Practical Financial Economics

ining the mandatory reconciliation between basic and diluted earnings pe
share. The impact of including this stock option expense is a decrease in after
tax net income as follows: 2000, $93 million; 1999, $66 million; 1998, $29
million; 1997, $39 million; and 1996, $22 million.
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Structures
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Form�
Source: Notes to the Financial Statements in 1998, 1999, and 2000 annual reports; 1997 Form
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1O-K.
million.�
'Includes Receivables from Enron: 2000, $410 million; 1999, $327 million; 1998, $196 million.
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bIncludes Payables to Enron: 2000, $302 million; 1999, $84 million; 1998, $296 million;
million.�
1997, $569 million.
2000,�
'Enron recognized revenues from transactions with unconsolidated equity affiliates: 2000,
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Another footnote of interest, "Related Party Transactions," appears for the
first time in the 1999 annual report (p. 59). A major concern is that these
transactions may lack the objectivity of
ofthe
the free market and consequently have
the potential to materially distort financial information. Extracts from Enron's
footnote include: "In June 1999, Enron entered into a series of transactions
involving a third party and LJM Cayman
Cayman....
.... A senior officer of Enron is the
managing member of LJM's general partner"; "An officer of Enron has in
vested in the limited partner of JEDI and from time to time acts as agent on
behalf of the limited partner's management." The thirty-seven lines of related
party disclosure in 1999 increase to ninety lines in 2000, indicating increased
activity in this area. The proxy statement for the 2001 shareholders' meeting
(available around the time of the release of the 2000 annual report) identifies
the senior official as Andrew Fastow, Enron's chief financial officer. The lim
ited partner is unknown. The footnote goes on to describe some of the related
party transactions and discloses pretax gains for Enron of approximately $16
million, which is not material. However, in 2000, the related party footnote
more than doubles in length (2000 annual report, 48-49). It starts as follows:
"In 2000 and 1999, Enron entered into transactions with limited partnerships
(the Related Party) whose general partner's managing partner is a senior offi
cial of Enron." The pretax effects on net income from transactions with these
partnerships appear to be in excess of $550 million. This is a substantial por
tion of Enron' s pretax earnings of $1,413. This raises serious questions about
the quality of earnings. Ideally, our consolidation adjustments for unconsoli
dated affiliates will adjust for these transactions, but we are not given enough
information to be completely confident.
Consolidation ofthese unconsolidated affiliates increases Enron's reported
debt equity ratio at December 31, 2000, by almost 40 percent, which could
result in violation of debt covenants. This ratio will be discussed in more de
tail when we perform the detailed financial analysis.
Additional Red flags
In addition to the concerns already raised, we review the relationships be
tween Enron's reported net income and cash flow from operating activities
and its reported net income before taxes and taxable income.
Table 5.4 clearly shows large and inconsistent fluctuations between net in
come and operating cash flow (especially in 2000), as well as enormous dif
ferences in reported net income (before taxes) and taxable income. This is an
indication that quality of earnings may not be high. In particular, the large gap
between 2000 net income of $979 million and cash generated by operations of
$4,779
$4,779 requires
requires more
more explanation.
explanation. Is
Is itit possible
possible that
that cash
cash flow
flow from
from investing
investing
activities
activities was
was diverted
diverted to
to cash
cash flow
flow from
from operating
operating activities?
activities? We
We have
have already
already
put
put forth
forth an
an argument
argument for
for this
this in
in regard
regard to
to noncurrent
noncurrent price-risk-management
price-risk-management
activities.
activities.
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Table 5.4
Enron's Relationships between Income, Cash Flows, and Taxes (US. Dollar
Amounts in Millions)

1. Net Income
Cash Flow from Operations
% Net Income to Cash Flow
2. Income before Income Taxes
Tax Payable on Income
% Tax Payable
% Deferred Tax
% Effective Tax

1996
$584
$884
69%
$855
64
7.5'10
24.2%
31.7%

1997
$105*
$211
50%
$15*
84
560%
(1160%)
(600%)

1998
$703
$1,640
43%
$878
88
10.1%
9.9%
20%

1999
$893
$1,228
73%
$1,128
83
7.4%
1.8%
9.2%

2000
$979
$4,779
15%
$1,413
227
16.1°/',
14.6%
30.7%

*Includes unusual nonrecurring contract restructuring charge of $675 million.

We also scrutinize the 1998 to 2000 annual reports for evidence of large
fourth quarter fluctuations, as annual reports are audited, whereas quarterly
reports are (normally) merely reviewed (Palepu et al. 2000, 3-12). Manage
ment could make adjustments in the fourth quarter to satisfy the external audi
tors; this would heighten our concern about the credibility of the numbers. We
do notice an anomaly during the fourth quarter of 2000. Revenues increased
by 36 percent over the third quarter, and yet net income decreased by 79 per
cent. We now feel even more comfortable with our decision to make adjust
ments to revenues.
Undoing Perceived Accounting Distortions
Before proceeding to financial analysis, we will undo accounting distor
tions as we believe warranted, based on our accounting analysis interpreta
tions. We had additional concerns, but we do not have enough information to
quantify and adjust for them. The adjustments we decided on for financial
analysis purposes are as follows:
Possible unrealized gains from price risk management activities (included in "Other
Revenues" on the income statement): Restate revenues (and net income before tax)
for 1999 and 2000, and reduce Retained Earnings. Income before tax decreases
materially as follows: 2000, $763 million; and 1999, $395 million. "Assets from
price risk management activities" decreases as well, to complete the double entry.
We also adjust for deferred taxation at the statutory federal income tax rate.
Possible unrealized gains on merchant assets and investments: Reduce revenues (and
net income before tax) and "Other Assets" as follows: 2000, $1,295 million; 1999,
$827 million; 1998, $721 million; 1997, $308 million; and 1996, $192 million. We
also adjust for deferred taxation at the statutory federal income tax rate.
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Consolidation ofthese unconsolidated affiliates increases Enron's reporte
debt equity ratio at December 31, 2000, by almost 40 percent, which coul
result in violation of debt covenants. This ratio will be discussed in more de
tail when we perform the detailed financial analysis.
Additional Red flags
In addition to the concerns already raised, we review the relationships be
tween Enron's reported net income and cash flow from operating activitie
and its reported net income before taxes and taxable income.
Table 5.4 clearly shows large and inconsistent fluctuations between net in
come and operating cash flow (especially in 2000), as well as enormous dif
ferences in reported net income (before taxes) and taxable income. This is a
indication that quality of earnings may not be high. In particular, the large ga
between 2000 net income of $979 million and cash generated by operations o
$4,779 requires more explanation. Is it possible that cash flow from investin
activities was diverted to cash flow from operating activities? We have alread
put forth an argument for this in regard to noncurrent price-risk-managemen
activities.
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Table 5.4
Enron's Relationships between Income, Cash Flows, and Taxes (US. Dollar
Amounts in Millions)

1. Net Income
Cash Flow from Operations
% Net Income to Cash Flow
2. Income before Income Taxes
Tax Payable on Income
% Tax Payable
% Deferred Tax
% Effective Tax

1996
$584
$884
69%
$855
64
7.5'10
24.2%
31.7%

1997
$105*
$211
50%
$15*
84
560%
(1160%)
(600%)

1998
$703
$1,640
43%
$878
88
10.1%
9.9%
20%

1999
$893
$1,228
73%
$1,128
83
7.4%
1.8%
9.2%

2000
$979
$4,779
15%
$1,413
227
16.1°/',
14.6%
30.7%

*Includes unusual nonrecurring contract restructuring charge of $675 million.

We also scrutinize the 1998 to 2000 annual reports for evidence of large
fourth quarter fluctuations, as annual reports are audited, whereas quarterly
al. 2000, 3-12). Manage
reports are (normally) merely reviewed (Palepu et a1.
ment could make adjustments in the fourth quarter to satisfy the external audi
tors; this would heighten our concern about the credibility of the numbers. We
do notice an anomaly during the fourth quarter of 2000. Revenues increased
by 36 percent over the third quarter, and yet net income decreased by 79 per
cent. We now feel even more comfortable with our decision to make adjust
ments to revenues.
Undoing Perceived Accounting Distortions
Before proceeding to financial analysis, we will undo accounting distor
tions as we believe warranted, based on our accounting analysis interpreta
tions. We had additional concerns, but we do not have enough information to
quantify and adjust for them. The adjustments we decided on for financial
analysis purposes are as follows:
Possible unrealized gains from price risk management activities (included in "Other
Revenues" on the income statement): Restate revenues (and net income before tax)
for 1999 and 2000, and reduce Retained Earnings. Income before tax decreases
materially as follows: 2000, $763 million; and 1999, $395 million. "Assets from
price risk management activities" decreases as well, to complete the double entry.
We also adjust for deferred taxation at the statutory federal income tax rate.
Possible unrealized gains on merchant assets and investments: Reduce revenues (and
net income before tax) and "Other Assets" as follows: 2000, $1,295 million; 1999,
$827 million; 1998, $721 million; 1997, $308 million; and 1996, $192 million. We
also adjust for deferred taxation at the statutory federal income tax rate.
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stock option
option expense
expense as
as aa decrease
decrease in
in after-tax
after-tax net income as
Adjustment for impact of stock
follows: 2000, $93 million;
million; 1999,
1999, $66
$66 million;
million; 1998,
1998, $29 million; 1997, $39 mil
lion; and 1996, $22 million.
million.
Consolidate unconsolidated affiliates
as best
best we
we can with the incomplete information
information
affiliates as
available to
to us
us (see
(see table
table 5.3).
5.3). Our
Our consolidated financial information is subject
subject to
the following limitations: we have only aggregated amounts for all affiliates; we do
not have individual affiliate ownership interest percentages, acquisition dates,
amounts, and preacquisition equity information; and we do not have the breakdown
of revenues and expenses that are not operating revenues/expenses and cannot split
these expenses between interest, income tax, and other expenses or revenues. Be
cause of the above limitations, assets may be understated, because we could not
determine at-acquisition goodwill. We achieve duality by adjusting the reported
amount for Minority Interests.
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TableS.S
Enron Ratio Analysis after Adjustments to Reported Amounts

Return on Equity
Return on Assets
Financial Leverage
Net Profit Margin
Asset Turnover
Gross Profit Margin
Basic EPS
Net PP&E Turnover
Current Ratio
Debt Equity Ratio

1996
12.2%
1.7%
7.2
2%
0.8
6.5%
0.86
1.4
1.1

5.7

1997
-3%
-0.5%.
6.5
-0.4%
1.1
4.1%
-0.28
1.9
1.4
4.5

1998
3.5%
0.5%
6.6
0.5%
1.0
4.9%
0.29
1.9
0.9
5.0

1999
0.4%
0.1%
6.6
0.1%
1.0
4.1%
-0.05
2.1
0.9
4.2

2000
-4.9%
-0.6%
7.9
-0.4%
1.6
0.8%
-0.73
4.4

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
Overview of Financial Analysis
The purpose of financial analysis is to assess the performance of the firm.
We use two tools for this purpose: ratio analysis and cash flow analysis. In
ratio analysis, we determine how selected financial statement line items relate
to each other, and we assess the firm's profitability. In cash flow analysis, we
analyze liquidity and evaluate cash flows from operating, investing, and fi
al. 2000, 9-1).
nancing activities (Palepu et a1.
Our financial analysis is somewhat limited by a lack of information on the
unconsolidated affiliates. For example, we do not have the details of interest
expense, income tax expense, and cash flow for these affiliates. Therefore, we
could not calculate the ratios that require this information (e.g., Earnings be
fore Income Tax margins), and consequently we could not use the PaIepu
Palepu et a1.
al.
(2000, 9-1 to 9-29) financial analysis model in its entirety. Although our fmancial
financial
analysis may not be as comprehensive as we would like it to be, we believe that
the key ratios that we could calculate provide us with enough information to make
an informed decision about Emon's financial results and condition.

Ratio Analysis
The ratios that we use for our personal decision-making purposes are sum
marized in table 5.5. These calculations are based the adjusted amounts that
Emon's reported amounts. Where relevant, we use the
we calculated, not on Enron's
average of the beginning and ending balances for assets, liabilities, and share
holders' equity in our ratio calculations. The only exception to this is for 1996,
because we do not have adjusted amounts for 1995.
The starting point for analyzing a firm's profitability is return on equity.
ROE indicates how well management has used shareholders' funding to gen
erate returns. On average, over long periods, large public U.S. firms havetradi

tionally generated ROEs of 11 to 13 percent (paIepu et aI. 2000, 9-3). Emon's ROEs
are: 2000, minus 4.6 percent; 1999,0.4 percent; 1998,3.2 percent; 1997, mi
nus 2.5 percent; and 1996, 12.2 percent. The return for 1996 is the only one
that is within the normal range. The subsequent years (1997 to 2000) are well
below this range, with 2000 being the worst year by far. Problems with overall
profitability appear to surface as early as 1997. A review of a Reed Wasden
Research publication (Wasden et a1. 2001,2-8) shows that Emon's ROEs (even
the preadjustment ROE) fall far short of those of its comparable peers-AES,
Calpine, Constellation, Duke, Dynegy, TXU, and Williams Companies. For
example, peer 2000 ROEs were 17.21 percent, 20.21 percent, 10.6 percent,
13.5 percent, 19.29 percent, 11.3 percent, and 9.14 percent, respectively. Even
Emon's preadjustment ROE of 7 percent is the lowest for this group. Yet, as
the report indicates (Wasden et a1. 2001, 2), Emon was trading at a substantial
valuation premium over its peers.
A further decomposition of ROE can be done, into return on assets or ROA
(Net Income/Average Assets) to determine how profitably assets have been
employed and financial leverage (Average Assets/Average Shareholders' Eq
uity), which shows how big the firm's asset base is relative to shareholder
investment. Enron's ROAs are 2000, minus 0.5 percent; 1999,0.06 percent;
1998, 0.4 percent; 1997, minus 0.4 percent; and 1996, 1.7 percent. An already
low ROA declined sharply from 1996 to 1997 and has remained at extremely
low or negative levels. Ratios for the peer group ranged between 2.45 and
5.37 for the 2000 fiscal year.
Financial leverage ratios, which show how many dollars of assets the firm
deploys for each dollar of shareholder investment, were fairly constant, ex
cept for the increase shown during the 2000 fiscal year: 2000,9.3; 1999,6.2;
1998, 7.1; 1997,6.1; 1996, 7.2. The main problem appears to be with the
ROA factor of ROE.
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Adjustment for impact of stock option expense as a decrease in after-tax net income a
follows: 2000, $93 million; 1999, $66 million; 1998, $29 million; 1997, $39 mil
lion; and 1996, $22 million.
Consolidate unconsolidated affiliates as best we can with the incomplete informatio
available to us (see table 5.3). Our consolidated financial information is subject t
the following limitations: we have only aggregated amounts for all affiliates; we d
not have individual affiliate ownership interest percentages, acquisition dates
amounts, and preacquisition equity information; and we do not have the breakdow
of revenues and expenses that are not operating revenues/expenses and cannot spli
these expenses between interest, income tax, and other expenses or revenues. Be
cause of the above limitations, assets may be understated, because we could no
determine at-acquisition goodwill. We achieve duality by adjusting the reporte
amount for Minority Interests.
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TableS.S
Enron Ratio Analysis after Adjustments to Reported Amounts

Return on Equity
Return on Assets
Financial Leverage
Net Profit Margin
Asset Turnover
Gross Profit Margin
Basic EPS
Net PP&E Turnover
Current Ratio
Debt Equity Ratio

1996
12.2%
1.7%
7.2
2%
0.8
6.5%
0.86
1.4
1.1
5.7

1997
-3%
-0.5'Y..
-0.5%.
6.5
-0.4%
1.1
4.1%
-0.28
1.9
1.4
4.5

1998
3.5%
0.5%
6.6
0.5%
1.0
4.9%
0.29
1.9
0.9
5.0

1999
0.4%
0.1%
6.6
0.1%
1.0
4.1%
-0.05
2.1
0.9
4.2

2000
-4.9%
-0.6%
7.9
-0.4%
1.6
0.8%
-0.73
4.4
1.1
7.2

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
Overview of Financial Analysis

,

The purpose of financial analysis is to assess the performance of the firm
We use two tools for this purpose: ratio analysis and cash flow analysis. I
ratio analysis, we determine how selected financial statement line items relat
to each other, and we assess the firm's profitability. In cash flow analysis, w
analyze liquidity and evaluate cash flows from operating, investing, and fi
nancing activities (Palepu et a1. 2000, 9-1).
Our financial analysis is somewhat limited by a lack of information on th
unconsolidated affiliates. For example, we do not have the details of interes
expense, income tax expense, and cash flow for these affiliates. Therefore, w
could not calculate the ratios that require this information (e.g., Earnings be
fore Income Tax margins), and consequently we could not use the PaIepu et a1
(2000, 9-1 to 9-29) financial analysis model in its entirety. Although our fmancia
analysis may not be as comprehensive as we would like it to be, we believe tha
the key ratios that we could calculate provide us with enough information to mak
an informed decision about Emon's financial results and condition.

Ratio Analysis
The ratios that we use for our personal decision-making purposes are sum
marized in table 5.5. These calculations are based the adjusted amounts tha
we calculated, not on Emon's reported amounts. Where relevant, we use th
average of the beginning and ending balances for assets, liabilities, and share
holders' equity in our ratio calculations. The only exception to this is for 1996
because we do not have adjusted amounts for 1995.
The starting point for analyzing a firm's profitability is return on equity
ROE indicates how well management has used shareholders' funding to gen
erate returns. On average, over long periods, large public U.S. firms havetradi

Emon's ROEs
tionally generated ROEs of 11 to 13 percent (paIepu et aI. 2000, 9-3). Enron's
are: 2000, minus 4.6 percent; 1999,0.4 percent; 1998,3.2 percent; 1997, mi
nus 2.5 percent; and 1996, 12.2 percent. The return for 1996 is the only one
that is within the normal range. The subsequent years (1997 to 2000) are well
below this range, with 2000 being the worst year by far. Problems with overall
profitability appear to surface as early as 1997. A review of a Reed Wasden
a1. 2001,2-8) shows that Emon's ROEs (even
Research publication (Wasden et al.
the preadjustment ROE) fall far short of those of its comparable peers-AES,
Calpine, Constellation, Duke, Dynegy, TXU, and Williams Companies. For
example, peer 2000 ROEs were 17.21 percent, 20.21 percent, 10.6 percent,
13.5 percent, 19.29 percent, 11.3 percent, and 9.14 percent, respectively. Even
Emon's preadjustment ROE of 7 percent is the lowest for this group. Yet, as
a1. 2001, 2), Emon was trading at a substantial
the report indicates (Wasden et al.
valuation premium over its peers.
A further decomposition of ROE can be done, into return on assets or ROA
(Net Income/Average Assets) to determine how profitably assets have been
employed and financial leverage (Average Assets/Average Shareholders' Eq
uity), which shows how big the firm's asset base is relative to shareholder
investment. Enron's ROAs are 2000, minus 0.5 percent; 1999,0.06 percent;
1998, 0.4 percent; 1997, minus 0.4 percent; and 1996, 1.7 percent. An already
low ROA declined sharply from 1996 to 1997 and has remained at extremely
low or negative levels. Ratios for the peer group ranged between 2.45 and
5.37 for the 2000 fiscal year.
Financial leverage ratios, which show how many dollars of assets the firm
deploys for each dollar of shareholder investment, were fairly constant, ex
cept for the increase shown during the 2000 fiscal year: 2000,9.3; 1999,6.2;
1998, 7.1; 1997,6.1; 1996, 7.2. The main problem appears to be with the
ROA factor of ROE.
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ROA can be further decomposed into Net Income/Sales multiplied by Sales/
Average Assets, the net profit margin and asset turnover ratios, respectively
(see table 5.5). Enron's profit margins are dismal, dropping from 2 percent in
1996 to -0.4 percent in 1997 and 2000. The two positive returns of 0.5 percent
and 0.1 percent in 1998 and 1999 are well below those of six of Enron's seven
peers. Comparative peer ratios for 2000 were: 9.58 percent, 16.32 percent, 8.9
percent, 3.6 percent, 1.70 percent, 4.78 percent, and 5.19 percent (Wasden et
al. 2001, 8). The asset turnover ratio appears to be reasonable, given the heavy
asset investment requirements that are characteristic of energy companies. Once
again, profitability appears to be problematic. Gross profit margins (calcu
lated with limited information as follow: [Operating Revenues - Operating
Costs and Expenses]/Operating Revenues) indicate a problem in 2000. The
ratios remained fairly constant from 1997 to 1999 but then dropped from 4.1
percent in 1999 to 0.8 percent in 2000, despite an increase of 129 percent in
the amount of operating revenue from 1999 to 2000. In summary, we are con
cerned about Enron's operating management. Restated earnings per share
strongly reinforce our concerns (1997, from 0.16 to negative 0.28; 1998, from
1.07 to 0.29; 1999, from 1.17 to negative 0.05; and 2000, from 1.22 to nega
tive 0.73). How do these deteriorating profit ratios justify the increase in stock
price of nearly 90 percent in 2000?
With regard to long-term asset management, the only ratio that we could
calculate was the property, plant & equipment (PP&E) turnover ratio (Sales/
Average Net PP&E), which shows the efficiency with which PP&E was used.
The only major fluctuation that we noted was the increase in this ratio from
2.1 in 1999 to 4.4 in 2000, a result of the dramatic increase in operating rev
enues in 2000, without a comparable increase in PP&E. As previously dis
cussed, we opine that the 2000 revenues are of questionable quality.
Finally, we evaluate financial management. Enron' current ratio (current
assetslcurrent
assets/current liabilities) appears to be consistently low, ranging between 0.9
and 1.4 for 1996 to 2000. From a debt and long-term solvency perspective,
our concerns center round the vastly deteriorating debt equity ratio in 2000.
Our restated consolidated amounts indicate an increase in the debt equity ratio
from 4.2 in 1999 to 7.2 in 2000. Also, reported debt/equity and restated debt/
equity showed a deterioration of close to 40 percent. This, along with earnings
management concerns, does not inspire investment confidence.
However, we will analyze Enron's cash flow numbers before reaching to a
final conclusion.

lion) and cash flow from operating activities ($4,779 million) for the 2000
fiscal year, a difference of $3.8 billion. In contrast, the difference for 1999
was a mere $335 million. Also, net cash from operating activities increased by
$3,551, or 289 percent, in 2000. Enron's management explains this enormous
difference as "primarily reflecting decreases in working capital, positive oper
ating results and a receipt of cash associated with the assumption of a contrac
tual obligation" (2000 annual report, 26). Our concern is that cash flow from
investing activities (e.g., sale of investment assets) may have been diverted to
cash flow from operating activities. Proceeds from the sale of merchant assets
and investments are recorded at $1,838 million. We also notice an amount of
$1,113 million cash inflow, described as "Other operating activities." The com
parative amount for 1999 was a mere $174 million. Is this the contractual
obligation of which management briefly makes mention? What is the nature
of this obligation? Should this obligation possibly be better classified as a
financing activity? We do not have the answers to these questions, but we do
not feel comfortable with the cash flow disclosures. We would like to see
more of an explanation from management, because of the materiality of the
difference between net income and cash flow from operating activities. If this
business generated this much in cash from operations, why is the current ratio
so low and the debt equity ratio so high at the end of 2000?
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Cash Flow Analysis
We do not have the required unconsolidated equity information to adjust
Enron's reported cash-flow information. Therefore, we will perform certain
aspects of cash-flow analysis based on reported amounts. We are particularly
interested in the large gap between Enron's reported net income ($979 milmil

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analyses, we would not recommend this stock. From
1997 onwards, our analyses indicate reporting and performance problems. We
have major concerns about profitability and debt levels.
Enron throws an abundance of information at financial analysts in its Form
lO-K filings (which are generally in excess of 200 pages). The language is not
always clear; it can be downright confusing, even to accounting experts-a
major red flag in and of itself. The quantity of information makes the analyst's
job time consuming and tedious, effectively drowning the analyst in paper,
and yet essential information (e.g., separate disclosures of unrealized gains on
trading activities) is not available. Nonetheless, this does not excuse those
analysts who overwhelmingly would not see the woods for the trees and who
continued recommending to clients that they buy or hold Enron stock.
Our investigation shows that the red flags were plentiful, and the situation
was aggravated by the apparent disdain Gudging by incidents reported in the
news media) with which Enron's top management dealt with financial analysts.
Coupled with the results of our accounting and financial analyses, we should be
very concerned about the competence, independence, and objectivity of financial
analysts who continued to recommend this stock. This raises the question of
whether these analysts were remiss in the discharge of their fiduciary duties.
We posit that financial analysts may have been buying into the mindset of
financial management, if one believes that the pre-Enron CFO literature re
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ROA can be further decomposed into Net Income/Sales multiplied by Sales/
Average Assets, the net profit margin and asset turnover ratios, respectively
(see table 5.5). Enron's profit margins are dismal, dropping from 2 percent in
1996 to -0.4 percent in 1997 and 2000. The two positive returns of 0.5 percent
and 0.1 percent in 1998 and 1999 are well below those of six of Enron's seven
peers. Comparative peer ratios for 2000 were: 9.58 percent, 16.32 percent, 8.9
percent, 3.6 percent, 1.70 percent, 4.78 percent, and 5.19 percent (Wasden et
al. 2001, 8). The asset turnover ratio appears to be reasonable, given the heavy
asset investment requirements that are characteristic of energy companies. Once
again, profitability appears to be problematic. Gross profit margins (calcu
lated with limited information as follow: [Operating Revenues - Operating
Costs and Expenses]/Operating Revenues) indicate a problem in 2000. The
ratios remained fairly constant from 1997 to 1999 but then dropped from 4.1
percent in 1999 to 0.8 percent in 2000, despite an increase of 129 percent in
the amount of operating revenue from 1999 to 2000. In summary, we are con
cerned about Enron's operating management. Restated earnings per share
strongly reinforce our concerns (1997, from 0.16 to negative 0.28; 1998, from
1.07 to 0.29; 1999, from 1.17 to negative 0.05; and 2000, from 1.22 to nega
tive 0.73). How do these deteriorating profit ratios justify the increase in stock
price of nearly 90 percent in 2000?
With regard to long-term asset management, the only ratio that we could
calculate was the property, plant & equipment (PP&E) turnover ratio (Sales/
Average Net PP&E), which shows the efficiency with which PP&E was used.
The only major fluctuation that we noted was the increase in this ratio from
2.1 in 1999 to 4.4 in 2000, a result of the dramatic increase in operating rev
enues in 2000, without a comparable increase in PP&E. As previously dis
cussed, we opine that the 2000 revenues are of questionable quality.
Finally, we evaluate financial management. Enron' current ratio (current
assetslcurrent liabilities) appears to be consistently low, ranging between 0.9
and 1.4 for 1996 to 2000. From a debt and long-term solvency perspective,
our concerns center round the vastly deteriorating debt equity ratio in 2000.
Our restated consolidated amounts indicate an increase in the debt equity ratio
from 4.2 in 1999 to 7.2 in 2000. Also, reported debt/equity and restated debt/
equity showed a deterioration of close to 40 percent. This, along with earnings
management concerns, does not inspire investment confidence.
However, we will analyze Enron's cash flow numbers before reaching to a
final conclusion.
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difference between net income and cash flow from operating activities. If this
business generated this much in cash from operations, why is the current ratio
so low and the debt equity ratio so high at the end of 2000?
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flects what was happening within financial management circles. When re
viewing this literature, bear in mind that the purpose of financial reporting is
to reflect underlying business reality so that external users can make informed
economic decisions. We conclude this chapter with examples from this litera
ture, which was freely available to financial analysts.
Ronald Fink, a senior editor of CFO Magazine, wrote about Enron's sub
stantial need for capital in June 1999: "But conventional financing techniques
to exploit the industry's current and potential size would jeopardize the BBB+
credit rating Enron earns
.... The financial balancing act that this situation
earns....
requires has turned Enron into a master of creative financing .... Enron does
not consolidate a number of highly leveraged subsidiaries in which it owns
or plans to own-no more than 50 percent of the voting stock. Under current
practice, Enron can use the equity method of treating these subsidiaries' re
sults, which keeps their debt and assets off Enron's own books." The article
goes on to describe the "creative financing" that Fastow used to keep some
$10 billion in long-term debt and other liabilities off Enron's balance sheet.
The writer concludes: "No wonder Fastow goes to great lengths to convince
financial analysts that such nonrecourse debt shouldn't be consolidated, re
gardless of FASB's position." A second article appears in the same publica
tion in October 1999 (Banham 1999), singing Fastow's praises for "walking
the tightrope" of creative financing: "Fastow's expert balancing act, in fact,
has earned him this year's CFO Excellence Award for Capital Structure Man
agement." The very acts that resulted in this Excellence Award are contrary to
the purpose of financial accounting, which is to help external decision makers
make informed decisions about the economic activities of the firm. I
NOTE
1. Enron's employee evaluation/incentive system that provided high rewards for
good short-term performance reports and termination for the bottom 15 percent "per
formers" certainly created a fertile environment for accounting manipUlation
manipulation and dis
torted reports (Cruver 2002). This fact must be taken into consideration for any firm
having or considering such a system.
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